Ego involvement moderates the assimilation effect of affective expectations by Gendolla, Guido et al.
ORIGINAL PAPER
Ego involvement moderates the assimilation effect of affective
expectations
Guido H. E. Gendolla Æ Kerstin Brinkmann Æ
Dorothea Scheder
Published online: 5 August 2008
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract Based on the affective expectations model and
research on mental effort mobilization, two experiments
manipulated affective expectations (no expectations versus
positive expectations) and ego involvement (low versus
high) and assessed participants’ affective reactions to
hedonically neutral stimuli. In Experiment 1, evaluations
were more positive when participants had positive expecta-
tions about neutral photos—but only when ego involvement
was low. High ego involvement neutralized this affective
expectation assimilation effect. Experiment 2 replicated
these findings for experienced mood after reading a hedon-
ically neutral short essay. Furthermore, high ego
involvement led to longer response latencies in the affect
ratings in Study 1. The findings support the idea that high ego
involvement resulted in relatively high mental effort that was
necessary to detect discrepancies between affective expec-
tations and stimuli’s real affective potential and therefore
moderated the assimilation effect to affective expectations.
Keywords Affective expectations  Ego involvement 
Mental effort
Introduction
In their affective expectations model (AEM), Wilson and
Klaaren (1992) posit that ‘‘people’s predictions about how
they will feel in a particular situation or toward a specific
stimulus’’ will most frequently result in affective assimila-
tion effects—that is, congruency between anticipated and
experienced affect. Assimilation to affective expectations
occurs when people are not aware of existing discrepancies
between their anticipation and stimuli’s actual affective
potential—for example, their ‘‘true’’ valence. For the rare
case that individuals notice a discrepancy between their
anticipations and reality, the AEM predicts that their affec-
tive reactions are contrasted away from the expectations.
In a typical study conducted in the context of the AEM,
participants are confronted with stimuli, like pictures,
descriptions, or films, and indicate their affective reactions
to them (see Wilson and Klaaren 1992). Expectations are
usually manipulated via verbal information about those
stimuli—the experimenter indicates, for example, how other
participants have reacted to the stimuli (e.g., Wilson et al.
1989). Processing effort—as a means of making discrepancy
detection more likely—is usually manipulated via direct
instructions how to process the stimuli: Participants are
asked to make repeated evaluations of the stimuli (e.g.,
Wilson et al. 1989), or to unitize the material (e.g., Geers and
Lassiter 1999). More recent studies have also operational-
ized processing effort as an individual difference variable,
via participants’ scores in questionnaires measuring need for
cognition (e.g., Geers and Lassiter 2003) or optimism (e.g.,
Geers and Lassiter 2002). Based on the AEM, these studies
tested the hypothesis that participants in the low processing
effort condition would assimilate their affective reactions to
the manipulated affective expectation (i.e., positive affective
reactions in the case of positive expectations, negative
affective reactions in the case of negative expectations),
while participants in the high processing effort condition
would show affective contrast effects (i.e., negative affective
reactions in the case of positive expectations, positive
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affective reactions in the case of negative expectations).
Whereas evidence for affective contrast effects due to high
processing effort is mixed (Wilson and Klaaren 1992)
though existent (e.g., Geers and Lassiter 1999, 2002, 2003),
affective assimilation is a robust, well replicated phenome-
non (e.g., Klaaren et al. 1994; Lee et al. 2006). Moreover,
assimilated affective reactions to stimuli like cartoons or
films occur relatively fast—an indicator of superficial, low-
effort stimulus processing (Wilson et al. 1989). These find-
ings have been obtained in studies using different types of
affective stimuli and samples including both women and
men as participants.
However, there are two possible points of critique on
previous AEM studies: First, previous studies have applied
relatively obtrusive manipulations for evaluating effort
with high demand characteristics (instructed unitization,
repeated evaluations). Second, a number of studies were
run in correlational designs that are less conclusive than
controlled experiments. The role of motivational states in
the mobilization of processing effort remained unclear. In
the present experiments, we aimed to resolve these issues
by manipulating a motivational variable—the level of ego
involvement. This variable does not only refer to partici-
pants’ motivational state during the processing of
potentially affective stimuli; it is also an indirect manipu-
lation of the motivation of processing effort because it does
not directly ask or imply more scrutinized processing of the
affective stimuli.
Ego involvement refers to situations in which ‘‘impor-
tant ego factors, e.g., social prestige, self-esteem, fear of
academic standing, are closely bound up in the tasks, and
where, because of this, performance is of more vital con-
sequence to the subjects’’ (Klein and Schoenfeld 1941, p.
249). In more recent research, ego involvement has been
manipulated by making individuals’ self-esteem contingent
upon a performance outcome—which is typically the case
in tests of important abilities (e.g., Ryan 1982). The
motivational consequence is that high ego involvement
frames situations as important for the individual and
therefore justifies the mobilization of relatively high mental
effort. In support of this idea, a series of experiments from
our laboratory with objective, physiological measures of
resource mobilization has shown that high ego involvement
indeed justifies the mobilization of high mental effort in
information processing. In support of the predictions of
motivational intensity theory (Brehm and Self 1989;
Wright 1996), we found that high ego involvement resulted
in the mobilization of high mental effort and more accurate
performance in learning and attention tasks when partici-
pants were confronted with difficult challenges or were
asked to ‘‘do their best’’ (Gendolla 1999; Gendolla and
Richter 2005, 2006). Referring to the AEM, this suggests
that high ego involvement should result in high processing
effort in affective evaluation tasks. Consequently, high ego
involvement should significantly reduce the assimilation of
experienced affect to anticipated affect and thus render
affective contrast effects more likely.
The present experiments
Participants were presented with hedonically neutral stim-
uli—photos from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang et al. 2001) or an essay (Kishon
1976)—with versus without positive affective expecta-
tions. Simultaneously, ego involvement was manipulated
to be high (important test) versus low (filler task). We
manipulated only positive expectations, because stimuli
that are expected to be negative can elicit automatic affect
regulation strategies that are counteractive to the assimi-
lation process (Taylor 1991). In accordance with the AEM,
we predicted (1) affective assimilation to the positive
expectation when ego involvement was low. However,
given its effect on effortful information processing, we
anticipated (2) that high ego involvement would signifi-
cantly reduce this effect, making affective contrast likely.
Moreover, we anticipated (3) that the more effortful stim-
ulus evaluation in the high ego involvement condition
would become visible in longer processing latencies.
Experiment 1: Picture evaluations
Participants watched and evaluated a series of hedonically
neutral IAPS pictures. We restricted the investigated
sample to women, because there are significant gender
differences in affective reactions to IAPS pictures (Lang
et al. 2001) and women were more accessible as partici-
pants at the time the study was run.
Method
Participants and design
Forty University students with different majors (all women,
average age 24 years) participated voluntarily and were
randomly assigned to a 2 (ego involvement: low vs.
high) 9 2 (expectation: no-expectation versus positive
expectation) between-persons design. All participants
received a small monetary reward corresponding to 4 USD.
Materials and procedure
The experimental procedure was computerized. After
having provided written informed consent and biographical
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data, participants in the high-ego-involvement condition
were presented with a computer screen showing the Uni-
versity logo and the header ‘‘GTS-VP—Geneva Test
System for Visual Perception.’’ The next screen gave the
bogus information that the study would be a test of per-
ceptual abilities, ostensibly a predictor of individuals’ fast
and efficient adaptation to situational changes and of
important social competencies. Participants read further
that they would be presented with a series of photos to
assess their personal perceptual ability. By contrast, par-
ticipants in the low-ego-involvement condition did not see
the logo with the header, but only read that they would see
a series of photos for testing stimulus material to be used in
a later study. Subsequently, the affective expectation
manipulation followed. The experimenter entered the lab-
oratory to start the picture presentation on the computer. In
the positive-expectation condition, she looked at a sheet
and mentioned ‘‘By the way, you are lucky—most other
participants have experienced the pictures in your condi-
tion as pleasant’’ before she started the presentation. In
pretests, this oral information had proven high efficiency
for manipulating a positive affective expectation without
raising suspicion. In the no-expectation condition the
experimenter started the presentation without mentioning
anything. Then the computer program presented 12
hedonically neutral IAPS pictures (each picture for 10 s).1
After the presentation, participants made hedonic evalua-
tions of the entire series of pictures—the dependent
variable. Participants answered the questions ‘‘To what
extent did you find the pictures pleasant’’, ‘‘How do you
evaluate the pictures concerning their esthetics,’’ and ‘‘To
what extent did the pictures please you?’’ on scales ranging
from not at all (1) to very much (7) by mouse clicks on
visual rating scales. Additionally, the experimental soft-
ware registered response latencies for the ratings—the time
between item onset and response entering. Finally, partic-
ipants were debriefed and received their payment.
Results and discussion
Hedonic evaluations
The highly correlated evaluation ratings were averaged to
an evaluation index (Cronbach’s a = 0.86). A 2 (ego
involvement) 9 2 (expectation) between-persons ANOVA
revealed a marginally significant expectation main effect,
F(1,36) = 3.95, p = 0.054, g2 = 0.10, indicating more
positive evaluations in the positive than in the no-expec-
tation condition (Ms = 5.27 vs. 4.67). This effect was
moderated by the expected significant interaction,
F(1,36) = 5.38, p \ 0.03, g2 = 0.13. Figure 1 shows that
evaluations in the low-ego-involvement/positive-expecta-
tion condition (M = 5.63, SD = 0.99) were significantly
more positive than in the low-ego-involvement/no-expec-
tation cell (M = 4.33, SD = 1.09), t(36) = 3.05,
p \ 0.004, r = 0.45, reflecting affective assimilation. But
when ego involvement was high, the no-expectation
(M = 5.00, SD = 0.98) and the positive-expectation cells
(M = 4.90, SD = 0.70) did not differ (p [ 0.50,
r = 0.03), indicating expectation neutralization. Thus,
although the cell means did not show a net contrast effect,
they clearly indicate that high ego involvement neutralized
the expectation effect.
Response latencies
A 2 9 2 ANOVA of participants’ average response laten-
cies of their evaluations (normally distributed and thus not
transformed) revealed only the anticipated ego involve-
ment main effect, F(1,36) = 5.65, p \ 0.03, g2 = 0.14. As
expected, responses in the high-ego-involvement condition
(M = 6751 ms, SD = 2260) were slower than in the low-
ego-involvement condition (M = 5340 ms, SD = 1427).
No other effect approached significance (ps [ 0.50).
Conclusion
In support of the predictions, ego involvement moderated
the effect of participants’ affective expectations about the
presented photos: Assimilation to the positive expectation
only occurred when ego involvement was low but not when





















Fig. 1 Cell means and standard errors of the picture evaluations in
the conditions of Experiment 1. Higher mean values indicate more
positive hedonic evaluations
1 We presented the following IAPS pictures from the upper range of
the hedonically neutral pictures: 1450, 1640, 2500, 2560, 5250, 5390,
5410, 5900, 7284, 7285, 8280, and 8465. The valence scores of these
pictures range from 5.59 to 6.38 on a 9-point scale.
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significantly slower evaluations, suggesting a more scruti-
nized stimulus processing.
Experiment 2: Mood experience
We conducted a conceptual replication of the first study in
order to be able to generalize the findings. Therefore, we
used a different type of stimulus (an essay), assessed a
different type of affect (mood), and recruited men for this




Forty University students (different majors, all men, aver-
age age 23 years) voluntarily participated and were
randomly assigned to a 2 (ego involvement: low versus
high) 9 2 (expectation: no-expectation versus positive
expectation) between-persons design.
Materials and procedure
The experimental session was again computerized. After
having provided informed consent and biographical data,
participants in the high-ego-involvement condition read
that the study would be a test of their social perception and
evaluation abilities. Moreover, it was explained that the
ability to perceive social situations fast and accurately
would be a social competence that was beneficial in various
life domains, for instance career development and efficient
leadership. To underline the test character in this condition,
the text was preceded by the University logo and the title
‘‘Social Perception Test.’’ Participants in the low-ego-
involvement condition did not receive this bogus informa-
tion. Then participants in the no-expectation condition
received the mere instruction to read a short text that would
follow and to answer some questions afterwards. Partici-
pants in the positive-expectation condition read in addition
that the text had pleased most other participants because it
was funny and enjoyable to read.
The manipulations were followed by the presentation of
a short text (300 words)—an excerpt of an essay entitled
‘‘On the road with the family’’ (Kishon 1976) describing
the communication between the author and his wife during
car rides. In a pretest with 7 men, the average amusingness
rating on a 7-point scale was M = 4.00 (SD = 1.31)—the
scale’s midpoint. Thus, we considered the text to be
hedonically neutral. To facilitate readability, participants
received a printed version of the essay and were informed
that they would have 2 min to read the text. They started
reading after a start signal (a ‘‘beep’’) and stopped after a
stop signal (another ‘‘beep’’).
Then participants made their ratings by pressing a
number key on the computer keyboard. First, we assessed
the main dependent variable—momentarily experienced
affect—with the positive (happy, joyful, contented, cheer-
ful) and negative (sad, frustrated, depressed, dissatisfied)
hedonic tone scales of the UWIST mood adjective check-
list (Matthews et al. 1990). Participants rated the adjectives
(‘‘Momentarily I’m feeling….’’) on scales ranging from not
at all (1) to very much (7). The experimental software also
registered response latencies defined as the time between
adjective onset on the screen and response entering. Next,
we assessed verbal manipulation checks of the expectation
(‘‘The text corresponded to my expectations’’; ‘‘I was
surprised about the text’’) and ego involvement manipula-
tions (‘‘To what extent was it worthwhile to understand the
described situation accurately?’’; ‘‘To what extent was it
worthwhile to be able to evaluate the described persons and
their relationship?’’). The rating scales ranged from not at
all (1) to very much (7). Finally, participants were thanked
for their participation and debriefed.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
The surprise and expectation ratings were negatively cor-
related, r(40) = -0.49, p \ 0.001, and therefore averaged
to an expectation index after recoding of the surprise rat-
ing. A 2 (ego involvement) 9 2 (expectation) ANOVA
revealed only a significant expectation main effect,
F(1,36) = 10.97, p \ 0.002, g2 = 0.23, indicating more
positive expectations in the positive-expectation condition
(M = 3.48, SD = 1.14 vs. M = 2.40, SD = 0.87). A
2 9 2 ANOVA of the correlated, r(40) = 0.58, p \ 0.001,
and therefore averaged value of success ratings found only
a significant ego involvement main effect, F(1,36) = 4.62,
p \ 0.04, g2 = 0.11, reflecting a higher value of success in
the high-ego-involvement condition (M = 5.03,
SD = 1.12 vs. M = 4.15, SD = 1.38). These results reflect
efficient manipulations of both independent variables.
Mood
Both the positive and negative affect sum scales showed
high internal consistency (both Cronbach’s a[ 0.83).
Because this study focused on positive affect, we consid-
ered the two scales separately with positive affect as the
primary variable of interest. A 2 (ego involvement) 9 2
(expectation) 9 2 (affect scale) mixed model ANOVA
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with repeated measures on the last factor revealed a sig-
nificant three-way interaction, F(1,36) = 5.12, p \ 0.03,
g2 = 0.12, that was further explored with separate 2 (ego
involvement) 9 2 (expectation) between-persons ANO-
VAs of the positive and negative affect scores. The analysis
of positive affect revealed a marginally significant expec-
tation main effect, F(1,36) = 3.26, p \ 0.08, g2 = 0.08,
indicating a trend to higher scores in the positive-expec-
tation condition (Ms = 20.05 vs. 18.00). Most relevant,
this effect was qualified by the expected significant inter-
action, F(1,36) = 11.49, p \ 0.002, g2 = 0.24. For the
low-ego-involvement condition, positive affect was sig-
nificantly more intense in the positive-expectation cell
(M = 21.90, SD = 3.48) than in the no-expectation cell
(M = 16.00, SD = 4.32), t(36) = 3.67, p \ 0.001,
r = 0.52, indicating an expectation assimilation effect (see
Fig. 2). Cell means in the high-ego-involvement condition
pointed into the opposite direction, suggesting an expec-
tation contrast effect. However, the difference between the
positive-expectation (M = 18.20, SD = 3.12) and the no-
expectation cells (M = 20.00, SD = 3.33) was not signif-
icant, t(36) = 1.12, p \ 0.27, r = 0.18.
A 2 9 2 ANOVA of the negative affect scores found no
significant effects (all ps [ 0.27; average negative affect
score M = 24.30, SD = 3.89). In summary, these results
demonstrate again that ego involvement moderated the
affective expectation effect, this time with a trend to a net
contrast effect when ego involvement was high.
Response latencies
We analyzed the non-transformed average response laten-
cies for the items of the negative and positive affect scales
(both were normally distributed). 2 9 2 ANOVAs found
no significant effects (ps [ 0.14). Nevertheless, for both
scales, response latencies were longer in the high-ego-
involvement condition (positive affect M = 4605 ms,
SD = 2492; negative affect M = 4439 ms, SD = 2429)
than in the low-ego-involvement condition (positive affect
M = 3932 ms, SD = 1868; negative affect M = 3427 ms,
SD = 1766).
Meta analysis of response latencies
As reported above, ego involvement had a significant effect
on the response latencies in Study 1 but not in Study 2—
although high ego involvement also led to longer pro-
cessing latencies in the latter study. Therefore, we used the
adding z-method (Rosenthal 1978) to run a combined
analysis of the ego involvement effects on the evaluation
processing latencies in Study 1 and the latencies for par-
ticipants’ ratings of the positive mood scale in Study 2, on
which ego involvement and affective expectations had a
significant effect. We converted the p-level of each com-
parison to its associated z-score, summed the z-scores, and
divided the sum by the square root of the number of
inference tests. The adding z-method revealed the predicted
ego involvement effect: When ego involvement was high,
the processing latencies were significantly longer than
when ego involvement was low, z = 2.28, p \ 0.02.
General discussion
The present experiments support the idea that ego
involvement neutralizes the assimilation effect of positive
affective expectations. As suggested by the AEM (Wilson
and Klaaren 1992), positive affective expectations led to
more positive hedonic evaluations of neutral pictures
(Study 1) and to a more positive mood after reading a
hedonically neutral short essay (Study 2) when ego
involvement was low. This conceptually replicated finding
adds to the existing evidence for assimilation effects to
affective expectations (Geers and Lassiter 1999, 2002,
2003; Klaaren et al. 1994; Lee et al. 2006; Wilson et al.
1989). Most relevant, in both of the present studies this
assimilation effect disappeared when ego involvement was
high. Moreover, compared to low ego involvement, high
ego involvement led to significantly longer response
latencies on the affective ratings (Study 1) and to higher
value of success ratings (Study 2). Furthermore, a com-
bined analysis of the response latencies in both studies
revealed that the combined processing latencies in the high
ego involvement condition were significantly longer than
the latencies in the low ego involvement condition. Taken
together, this supports our idea that ego involvement jus-
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Fig. 2 Cell means and standard errors of the positive affect ratings in
the conditions of Experiment 2. Higher mean values indicate more
intense positive affect
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which is necessary to detect discrepancies between
expectations and reality. By this way ego involvement
neutralizes affective expectations. However, despite the
fact that some previous studies found evidence for signif-
icant affective contrast effects due to increased processing
effort (e.g., Geers and Lassiter 1999), the present studies
did not. Nevertheless, the affective assimilation effect was
significantly reduced in the high ego involvement condition
of both studies, and Study 2 found at least a trend towards a
contrast effect.
The equivocal evidence for affective contrast suggests
that the strength of this effect may depend on more factors
than merely recognizing a discrepancy between expectation
and reality—it is possible that significant contrast effects
necessitate recognizing a large discrepancy (see Stapel and
Suls 2007, for an overview). Affective contrast seems to be
the result of a comparison between a stimulus and a ref-
erence value, such as a mood inducing event (Abele and
Gendolla 1999), alternatives to reality (Markman and
McMullen 2003; McMullen 1997), the expected function
of a judgment object (Martin et al. 1997), or an affective
expectation (Geers and Lassiter 1999). However, as known
for long (Sherif and Hovland 1961), one of the critical
variables that determines if comparisons result in signifi-
cant net contrast effects is the extent of the detected
discrepancy between a stimulus and its reference value
(e.g., Herr 1986; Manis et al. 1988). Accordingly, signifi-
cant affective contrast effects should be particularly likely
when a large discrepancy between an affective expectation
and a stimulus’ affective potential is detected—for instance
in the case of a positive affective expectation about a
highly aversive stimulus, which was not the case in the
present study. From this perspective, the present expecta-
tion neutralization effects can be regarded as the outcome
of a contrast producing process, instigated by a comparison
between the stimuli and a reference value—participants’
affective expectation. But given that the actual discrepan-
cies between participants’ expectations and the stimuli’s
‘‘real’’ valence were rather small—positive expectations
for hedonically neutral but not aversive stimuli—the net
effect was also relatively small and emerged as expectation
neutralization rather than a significant contrast effect.
Consequently, we have to let it to future studies to
manipulate larger discrepancies between affective expec-
tations and stimuli’s real valence to test if ego involvement
results in significant contrast effect—which is strongly
suggested by the results of the present Study 2.
Another explanation for the effect that ego involvement
neutralized the affective assimilation effect could be that
our ego involvement manipulation induced an affective
state instead of manipulating processing effort. From this
perspective, the performance consequences for partici-
pants’ self-esteem in the high-ego-involvement condition
could have induced a state of worry, anxiety, or even anger,
resulting in an affect-congruency effect leading to less
positive evaluations (cf. Curtis and Locke 2007; Lerner and
Keltner 2000). However, two reasons speak against this
interpretation. First, our previous studies have clearly
shown that the present ego involvement manipulation had
replicated effects on effort mobilization. Second, those
studies have included measures of participants’ affective
states in response to the ego involvement manipulation.
However, none of those studies found any evidence for
increased worry, anxiety, or another negative feeling in
response to the ego involvement manipulation (Gendolla
1999; Gendolla and Richter 2005, 2006). Moreover, it is of
note that participants took longer to make their affect rat-
ings in the present high ego involvement conditions,
reflecting longer—and thus more effortful—processing.
Consequently, we attribute the here presented effects of
ego involvement to increased processing effort rather than
an affect congruency effect.
In this context it is also of note that the present ego
involvement effects appear to be in contradiction to the
finding that ego involvement is frequently associated with
superficial processing (see Utman 1997). An explanation
for this discrepancy could be that our ego involvement
manipulation did not lead to anxiety or worry, which can
impair performance (Ryan, personal communication).
Consequently, ego involvement had only its positive effect
to justify relatively high processing effort that resulted in
reduced assimilation effects to participants’ affective
expectations. The reason for this could be that our ego
involvement manipulation did not only target on ability
evaluation but also highlighted performance criteria.2
In a broader perspective of motivation and information
processing, it is interesting that the present effects of ego
involvement on affective expectations are similar to the
effects of personal relevance manipulations in research on
persuasion and attitude change. In that domain, it has been
shown that personally relevant attitude issues lead to higher
elaboration of persuasive messages—that is, to the mobi-
lization of more mental effort (see Petty and Wegener
1998, for a review). In attitude research, the outcome of
message elaboration depends then on argument quality.
The result can be persuasion (i.e., assimilation to the per-
suasive message) in the case of high argument quality or
non-persuasion (i.e., contrast to the persuasive message) in
the case of low argument quality. This appears to be
compatible with the here demonstrated effects of ego
involvement on affective experiences: Personal
2 We are indebted to Richard M. Ryan for providing this explanation
that provides a facility to reconcile our findings with other
documented ego involvement effects on performance.
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involvement justifies high mental effort resulting in more
thorough affective processing.
Another interesting outlook from the present studies
pertains to cognitive emotion theories, especially appraisal
theories. In this theoretical perspective, researchers highly
agree that individuals’ reactions to affective stimuli are
influenced by top–down information processing—that is,
subjective evaluations of affective stimuli and the context
in which they occur (see Kappas 2006, for a recent review).
Interestingly, appraisal theories put emphasis on the role of
the personal importance of stimuli and events as a neces-
sary (Arnold 1960), amplifying (Lazarus 1991; Smith and
Lazarus 1990), or moderating (Scherer 2001) variable for
emotional reactions. The present findings suggest that
personal importance results in more effortful and thus more
accurate processing of affective stimuli—an aspect that, to
date, has not been considered in appraisal theories of
emotions.
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